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Book Review
A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code. By William
D. Hawkland, and Chapter IV by William R. Klaus, Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the A.L.I. and the A.B.A.,
Philadelphia, 1964. Pp. 1105, including Index.
The Uniform Commercial Code has now been adopted by more
than forty jurisdictions in the United States. This considerable revision of our commercial law has caused some concern among practicing lawyers, who are often justifiably hesitant to rely on the plain
words of a statute rather freely interpreted by judges in accordance
with the judges' view of the applicable policy and the sense and need
of the situation. Practitioners, therefore, understandably desire authoritative confirmation of statutory meaning.
The U.C.C. is an exceptionally well drafted document and deals
with areas that have long been regulated by statute. Nevertheless, its
meaning is not always immediately evident. Thus, the practitioner
will certainly find analysis and rephrasing of the statute helpful. Of
the many publications of varying quality now offering such analysis,
A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code is one of the
more useful.
Until recently, about the only valuable writing in this field was
a scattering of law review articles, Banks and the Uniform Commercial
Code,' and the five Practice Handbooks.2 Anderson's treatise3 was a
disappointment, although its index was occasionally helpful. With the
exception of the collection of Coogan, Hogan and Vagts on secured
transactions,4 little thorough analysis of the Code is available outside
the law reviews. Bunn, Snead and Speidel recently wrote a very
readable, short introduction.' A Transactional Guide offers an intermediate treatment. It is a fairly comprehensive introduction with
substantial analysis.
The emphasis of A Transactional Guide is practical rather than
theoretical. On the whole, the organization of the Guide is based
on the statute, with each Article of the Code discussed separately.
Despite its size, the Guide is essentially a condensed, brief work. The
analysis is not always thorough and must be used with care and sense.
The following examples of ambiguities or inaccurracies should not be
1.
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lished in 1953.
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(2d ed. 1964), first pub-

2. Published by the Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the

A.L.I. and the A.B.A. Two of these handbooks were written by William D. Hawkland.
3. ANDERSON'S U.C.C. (1961).
4. COOGAN, HOGAN AND VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
5. BUNN, SNEAD AND SPSIDSL, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

(1963).

(1964). The Uniform Commercial Code Handbook published by the A.B.A.
Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law (1964) is a useful and unusually
economical work also worthy of consideration.
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taken as derogating the over-all usefulness of the treatise. The intent
is to caution against too much reliance on any available analysis
of the U.C.C.
Dean Hawkland states correctly that the Code provides "that a
payee may be a holder in due course to the same extent and under the
same circumstances as any other holder."' He goes on, however, to
obscure the scheme of Article 3 on this point by stating that usually
"the payee will not be a holder in due course, because being an immediate
party in most situations, he usually will take the instrument with an
awareness of the defenses." 7 This statement is technically correct,
except that it is doubtful that the payee knows of the defense in the
typical case. The more important and more general rule is that under
§ 3-305(2) no defenses are cut off between parties who have dealt
with each other, even though one of them may be a holder in due course.
Thus the payee seller who has unknowingly breached a warranty will
be subject to that defense, but he will not thereby lose his status as a
holder in due course. Being a holder in due course although subject to
the defenses of the maker is important, for example, under § 3-418,
which makes certification of a check final in favor of a holder in
due course.
Dean Hawkland's discussion of taking an instrument in good faith
and without notice could also be misleading. His inclusion of the
requirement of taking without notice under the rubric of good faith
may be permissible rhetoric, but it becomes dangerous when it is said
that the Code "generally adopts the 'white heart' test of good faith."'
The treatise points only to certain suspicious circumstances listed in
§ 3-302(3), such as purchasing at a judicial sale, as limiting the
"white heart" doctrine.' This analysis fails to point out the possibilities of the requirement of taking without notice when read with
§ 1-201(25) which provides that: "A person has 'notice' of a fact
when . . . from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the

time in question he has reason to know that it exists."'
The discussion in the treatise of the right of a party to a negotiable
instrument to set up the defenses of some third person is an admirable
simplification of this difficult problem." Section 3-306(d) allows the
defense that payment would be inconsistent with the terms of a restrictive indorsement, or the defense of theft, and then provides: "The claim
of any third person to the instrument is not otherwise available as a
defense to any party liable thereon unless the third person himself defends the action for such party." The term "claim to the instrument"
is arguably a continuation of the concept of defective title under § 55
of the NIL, which covered situations such as fraud or duress where
rescission would traditionally be available. Dean Hawkland assumes
that defenses of third parties may also be urged where the person having
6.
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GuIDx 539 (1964).

7. Ibid.
8. Id. at 534-40.
9. Id. at 540.

10. Thus, New York's retention of the old NIL § 56 rule that notice will only
prevent one being a holder in due course if "his action in taking the instrument amounts

to bad faith" is not without substance. N.Y.U.C.C. § 3-304(7).
11. HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 6, at 546.
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the defense defends the action. He may be right, but some discussion
or at least warning would have been appropriate.
The brief discussion of the interrelationship of the UCC and the
Bankruptcy Act is generally accurate and helpful and certainly necessary to a full understanding of Article 9. In the discussion of Moore
v. Bay,12 however, the treatise takes an unjustifiably definite stand on
a difficult and unresolved problem. Moore v. Bay held that a chattel
mortgage, which was voidable under state law as to unsecured creditors
who became such prior to a delayed recording, was void as against the
trustee in bankruptcy, and that it was totally void, not just void to the
extent of such creditors' claims. As the treatise correctly states, Article
9 is designed to avoid most of the effect of this decision. Under the
U.C.C., no simple, unsecured creditor comes ahead of a security interest.
The U.C.C. naturally continues the prior law that a security
interest is subordinate to the claim of a creditor with a lien by attachment or execution, i.e., a lien creditor, whose lien arose prior to the
perfection of the security interest.13 The trustee can avoid and preserve
for the benefit of the estate any judgment lien acquired within four
months of bankruptcy under § 67 of the Bankruptcy Act. Dean
Hawkland concludes that a judgment lien of $500 acquired within
four months of bankruptcy and attaching before perfection of a security
interest of $10,000 could be used by the trustee to totally defeat the
security interest under § 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act and the doctrine
of Moore v. Bay. This conclusion is perhaps supported by the literal
words of the statute and the case, but such an extension of the unreasonable doctrine of Moore v. Bay is not required.
Dean Hawkland's reasoning would apply with almost equal force
to a security interest which is subordinate to a small federal tax lien,
where the tax lien is not good against the trustee in bankruptcy. 4 If
the language in § 70(e), "voidable for any other reason by any
creditor," includes being subordinate to a superior security interest, tax
lien, or judgment lien, then the continuing application of Moore v. Bay
is substantial. Professor MacLachlan would avoid this result by concluding, with some difficulty, that the term "creditor" in § 70(e)
does not include a secured or lien creditor.'" A somewhat better
argument is that the term "voidable" does not include being subordinate
to some other lien.'
Although Professor Hawkland's position is
tenable, the condensed treatise should have7 indicated the alternative
solution protecting the secured transaction.'
12. 284 U.S. 4 (1931). See HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 6, at 695-96.
13. UNIrORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301.

14. See Phoenix Title and Trust Co. v. Stewart, 337 F.2d 978, 985-86 (9th Cir.
1965) and Wethered v. Alban Tractor Co., 224 Md. 408, 415-16, 168 A.2d 358, 361-63,
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 830 (1961). The bootstrap syllogism seems to be essentially
this: the security interest is subordinate to some lien; the lien is voidable by the
trustee, and he claims its benefit; the trustee merely represents the unsecured creditors;
therefore, the security interest is voidable by the unsecured creditors within the
meaning of § 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act.
15. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 286, at 335 (1956).
16. 1 COOGAN, HOGAN AND VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 4, § 9.03(3) (iv).
17. Dean Hawkland, with good reason, does not discuss the even more involved
danger to security interests presented by the virtually unfollowed solution to the
problem of circuity of claims in In Re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1956).
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A Transactional Guide is more thorough than the ALI-ABA

Handbooks, which have been very helpful. The Guide has the additional advantages of coverage of Article 8 on Investment Securities,
sample forms, and an index. Although there have been some departures
by individual states from the official text of the U.C.C., these have been
relatively minor, and the exclusion of such variations from a basic
work such as the Guide seems preferrable. As the cases interpreting
the statute accumulate, supplements to this treatise, along with such
efforts as the annotations being published by the Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review, should provide a view of the U.C.C.
sufficiently national to minimize parochial interpretations of the statute.

Hal M. Smith*
* Professor, University of Maryland Law School.

